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Abstract
This essay focuses on the developments that are most important for the current and future
roles of the United Nations post Cold War. The U.N.’s involvement in the ending of the colonial
system and in providing help to Third World economies establishes the basis for the present-day
assumption that it is the responsibility of the world organization to shore up societies that collapse,
or threaten to collapse, into disorder.
ESSAYS
THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE COLD WAR:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE POST-COLD
WAR SITUATION
Inis L. Claude, Jr.*
The transient euphoria induced by the ending of the Cold
War rested in part on a view that we might call the "Rip Van
Winkle," or perhaps the "Sleeping Beauty," theory of the United
Nations. This was the notion that the world organization had
been dormant throughout the period of the Cold War but had
now awakened and could, at long last, become the kind of or-
ganization described in its Charter and begin to function as its
founders had intended in 1945. This line of thought incorpo-
rates fallacies about both the past and the future of the United
Nations. The United Nations of the 1990's is not free to function
in the manner contemplated by its creators; its activities will be
determined not by its founding fathers but by its operating sons
and daughters, and it will have to react to global conditions very
different from those of 1945. Moreover, its future character will
be profoundly influenced by what it had become by 1990. The
United Nations had been drastically and, for the most part, dis-
advantageously affected by the Cold War, but it is simply not true
that it had been reduced to inactivity. During those four de-
cades, it had grown, changed, adapted, and developed in re-
sponse to the needs, demands, opportunities, and circumstances
of the time. A great many things of significance happened dur-
ing the Cold War in, through, and to the United Nations. I
should like to focus on the developments that are most impor-
tant for the current and future roles of the world organization.
At the root of many of those developments lies the fact that
the United Nations became a prominent instrument of the anti-
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colonial movement, used to encourage, promote, and confer le-
gitimacy upon decolonization. The success of that movement,
manifested in the rapid and near-total replacement of colonies
by newly independent states, reflected the failure of the ideal of
trusteeship that had figured in both the Covenant of the League
of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations. Trusteeship
purported to offer careful preparation for colonial emancipa-
tion, and it is one of the tragedies of twentieth-century interna-
tional organization that such a scheme never really caught on,
gained the confidence of potential clients, or produced the
promised results. For better or for worse, the colonial peoples
rejected gradualism in favor of Freedom Now, and the United
Nations became a party to the creation of the so-called Third
World of new states. Unfortunately, many of these entities were
ill-prepared for independence, and their emergence accounts in
considerable degree for the plethora of failed and uncertainly
viable states that contribute so heavily to the global disorder of
our time. The United Nations, having had some responsibility
for the creation of these states, bears some responsibility for res-
cuing them from the chaos into which they all too frequently
fall.
A direct consequence of decolonization was the entry into
the United Nations of virtually all the new states, which gradually
brought about the Third World's political control and ideologi-
cal domination of the General Assembly and, through the As-
sembly, of many of the processes and programs of other organs.
Naturally enough, this new majority formulated an agenda fea-
turing the needs, values, and demands of its members, so that
economic assistance and measures for promoting the economic
development of Third World states became increasingly promi-
nent parts of the U.N.'s activity. In some sense, the United Na-
tions became an agency of post-independence trusteeship, as
erstwhile colonial peoples, having refused to delay indepen-
dence for preparation, sought post facto assistance in achieving
the capacity for successful statehood. The U.N.'s involvement in
the ending of the colonial system and in providing help to Third
World economies establishes the basis for the present-day as-
sumption that it is the responsibility of the world organization to
shore up societies that collapse, or threaten to collapse, into dis-
order.
The United Nations of the period under discussion also be-
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came an agent - indeed, the world's chief agent - of the con-
ferment and the denial of collective legitimacy. Its organs, and
particularly the General Assembly, came to be regarded as au-
thoritative articulators of the community will, as sources of politi-
cally valuable pronouncements of multilateral approval and dis-
approval. Exploiting this development, member states avidly
sought the blessing of the United Nations for themselves and
invoked its curse upon their antagonists. Collective legitimiza-
tion became a major function of the organization, in part be-
cause of the usual unwillingness and incapacity of the U.N.'s
members to take strong and decisive action. The Cold War and
deeply entrenched national dispositions to shy away from risky
enforcement actions reduced collective security to collective
delegitimization; aggressors were typically confronted not with
multilateral resistance but with multilateral condemnation. The
emergence of the collective legitimization function was also pro-
moted by the decolonization movement, which found significant
value in U.N. denunciation of colonialism and endorsement of
efforts to overthrow it. As the Third World emerged, it used its
growing voting power to make the United Nations its ideological
ally, exploiting the organization's global acoustics to proclaim
support for the myriad complaints and demands of new states.
This development of the Cold War period is the major source of
today's multilateralist emphasis, with its bias against naked uni-
lateralism and its urge to seek the cover of U.N. authorization. It
also contributes to the prevailing tendency to rely on declara-
tory, symbolic, tongue-lashing, wrist-slapping action as a pretense
of but actual substitute for serious response to nasty situations.
The fruit of collective legitimization is all too often the substitu-
tion of posturing for genuine confrontation of issues.
Today's international agenda is shaped by the New In-
terventionism: the tendency to attribute to the United Nations
- and perhaps to states able to secure the approval or to avoid
the disapproval of the United Nations - the authority and even
the obligation to intervene in domestic situations that appear
dangerous or offensive to the outside world. The roots of this
tendency can be found not only in the United Nations of the
Cold War era but also in the League of Nations. The constitu-
tional documents of both the League and the United Nations
provided for the exemption of the domestic jurisdiction of states
from the purview of international bodies. As early as 1923, how-
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ever, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the Advi-
sory Opinion concerning the Nationality Decrees Issued in Tu-
nis and Morocco,' held that the fence dividing the fields of do-
mestic and international jurisdiction was a movable one, subject
to shifts brought about by the making of treaties. This acknowl-
edgement that matters substantively domestic in nature may be,
or may become, legally international concerns prefigured major
changes in jurisdictional views in the period of the U.N.'s devel-
opment. The Charter provided a license for international reac-
tion to human rights abuses within states, and the United Na-
tions has been persistently injected into domestic situations
thought to have serious international repercussions. Increas-
ingly, the United Nations has been used to proclaim standards of
appropriate behavior for governments within their own territo-
ries, and to sponsor or approve interference when voting majori-
ties become sufficiently indignant about violations. Campaigns
waged in the United Nations against colonialism, apartheid and
other manifestations of racism, and gross violations of human
rights might be interpreted as having the effect not merely of
shifting the jurisdictional fence but of dismantling it. Debate in
the United Nations about domestic jurisdiction is today almost as
pass6 as debate in the United States about states' rights; while
the wisdom or feasibility of U.N. intervention in particular cases
may be questioned, the organization's authority to intervene is
seldorri seriously at issue. If the United Nations is now the victim
of excessive expectations and over-burdening, the fault lies
partly in this erosion of limitations on its jurisdiction.
Finally, let me note the invention of peacekeeping, a U.N.
political function unknown to the Charter. Its real beginning
was the improvisation of the United Nations Emergency Force
("UNEF I") to help the parties disentangle themselves from the
Suez fiasco in 1956,2 and it was given definition and theoretical
elaboration by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in 1960.1
1. Advisory Opinion No. 4, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4.
2. See Summay Study of the Experience Derivedfrm the Establishment and Operation of the
Force: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Agenda Item 65(c), Annex,
at 8, U.N. Doc. A/3943 (1958) [hereinafer UNEF Summay Study] (discussing accom-
plishments of UNEF I).
3. See Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organi-
zation, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. IA, U.N. Doc. A/4390/Add. 1 (1960) (stating
Hammarskjold's conception of peacekeeping).
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Peacekeeping entails the deployment in trouble spots, with con-
sent of the parties, of military or, occasionally, civilian police
contingents contributed by acceptably neutral states and operat-
ing under U.N. command and control. Its mission is to help
those parties maintain a tenuous peace - not to fight, or to
prevent fighting, but to assist parties who realize assistance is re-
quired to avoid the degeneration of their relationships into vio-
lence. Peacekeeping is a neutralizing role that can be played
only by an agency and its agents in whose commitment to impar-
tiality the parties have confidence. If the Cold War largely pre-
vented the development of the political functions assigned to the
United Nations in its Charter, it inspired and facilitated the for-
mulation of the peace-keeping function. In the post-Cold War
era, this notable political innovation has given rise to the
proliferation of U.N. missions of various kinds, undertaking di-
verse tasks. Unfortunately, a general tendency has developed to
label all such operations as peace-keeping missions, even though
many of them might more accurately be described as peace-mak-
ing, peace-enforcing, humanitarian aid-giving, or even war-fight-
ing operations. There is an urgent need for all concerned to
introduce honesty, clarity, and precision into the characteriza-
tion of the functions assigned to U.N. operations, eschewing the
indiscriminate use of the peace-keeping euphemism. The con-
fusing mixture of functions and labels in the current series of
U.N. operations stems ultimately from the relatively simple ori-
gins of peace-keeping in the midst of the Cold War.
This is not, of course, the complete story of the United Na-
tions in the years of the Cold War, but enough has been said to
demonstrate that the world organization was by no means dor-
mant during that period. One may evaluate some aspects of this
record positively, and others negatively, but one cannot deny
that it included developments that have a major impact on inter-
national relations today and on the present and future roles of
the United Nations.
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